Defending Stakeholder Governance by Greenfield, Kent
Case Western Reserve Law Review




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1043 (2008)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol58/iss4/9
PANEL 1: STAKEHOLDER THEORY






Corporations are collective enterprises, drawing on investments
from various stakeholders who contribute to the firm's success. For a
business to succeed over time, it must induce people and institutions
to invest money, whether in the form of equity or loans. It must
induce people to invest their labor, intelligence, skill, and attention by
joining the firm as employees or managers. It must induce local
communities to invest infrastructure of various kinds. None of these
investors-for investors they all are-contributes its input out of
altruism or obligation. They all do so because they believe that the
corporation provides the mechanism for gathering all of those inputs
and using them to produce goods and services that can be sold for
profit. These investors invest because they believe the corporation
provides them a way to benefit from that collective action, by sharing
in some way from the financial surplus that is created. The
investments are structured differently, and the returns on some are
riskier and more variable than others. But they are all investments,
and all of these investors have a stake in the success of the company.
. Copyright 2008 by Kent Greenfield. All rights reserved.
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When corporations are seen in this way, as mechanisms for
bringing together various investments in order to produce goods and
services for profit, the fundamental problems of the corporate form
are brought to the fore. One problem is how to induce investment
from the various contributors to the firm. The other is how to allocate
the financial surplus that is created.
The solution to these two problems, according to the view of
mainstream corporate law doctrine and scholarship, is that we need to
worry only about the investment of one of the many investors, namely
that of shareholders. Shareholders are induced to invest by offering
them various legal protections, most prominently the right to be the
beneficiary of management's fiduciary obligations. The second
problem-the allocation of the corporate surplus-is solved in an
analogous way. Shareholders receive the protection of the legal rule
that holds management to an obligation to shift as much of the surplus
to the shareholders as possible.
The other investors in the firm-employees, communities,
creditors-are left to contract with the firm at arm's length. They get
whatever they get from the firm according to how much they can
negotiate from the firm. They have only those protections and only
that portion of the surplus they bargain for.
Stakeholder governance is the notion that the concerns of all the
firm's investors should be brought into the governance of the firm.
This notion is based on a recognition that non-shareholder
stakeholders are investors, too, and have interests that should be taken
into account by the firm's management. It is based on a conviction
that, as law is used to overcome impediments to shareholder
investment, law can be used to overcome impediments to investment
by other stakeholders. Support for stakeholder governance also
springs from the belief that it provides a mechanism to protect the
interests of stakeholders that is more efficient, as a regulatory matter,
than other forms of legal support and protection. Finally, stakeholder
governance grows from a confidence that corporations themselves
will be better managed in the long term when management is held to
consider the interests of all key investors of the firm, not just a small
subset of them.
Professor George W. Dent, Jr. has given me the credit of offering a
careful, if hyperbolic, critique of my past work in support of
stakeholder governance.' While there are significant areas of
I See George W. Dent, Jr., Stakeholder Governance: A Bad Idea Getting Worse, 58 CASE
W. RES. L REv. 1107, 1107 (2008) (comparing proposals of stakeholder governance reform to
"Dracula," "an ogre," "utopia," and "fantasies").
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agreement, action on which would represent important progressive
reform,2 he does not mince words in criticizing the bulk of my
arguments and that of other stakeholder theorists such as Professor
Timothy Glynn, who also appeared at this Symposium and whose
writing appears in this volume. Dent's critiques fall into several
categories, and I will seek to answer them in turn. His most prominent
critiques, however, suffer from the same flaw. On the one hand, he
decries the lack of shareholder power within the corporate form,
corporate doctrine, and securities regulation. He calls for legal
reforms to protect shareholder prerogatives and shareholder wealth.3
The government must step in, he says in effect, in order to protect
shareholders from the vagaries of the market. On the other hand, in
the face of overwhelming evidence that various stakeholders of
the corporation-employees in particular-are also suffering, he
concedes the need but urges a trust in the market as the response.
Stakeholders should trust in the market even if it is inefficient,
defective, or slow in responding. Shareholders, in contrast, may call
on government assistance because, after all, the market is inefficient,
defective, and slow in responding. To the extent government
protection is necessary for stakeholders, they should seek help from
outside corporate governance.
Corporate law is a powerful legal tool to restrain and channel the
power of businesses, the largest of which embody economic power
rivaling that of nations.4 The extensive framework of corporate law
has long been used to protect shareholders, even while it left aside the
interests of other contributors to corporate success.5 The existence of
2 See id. at 1108 (agreeing that economic inequality is undesirable, that CEO pay is too
high, and that "employees and other stakeholders have an interest in the success of their
company"); id. at 1127 (urging employees be given more information about hazards in the
workplace, more regulation of hazards, and "broader exceptions to limited liability"); id. at
1127, 1122 (discussing the possibility of limiting insurance coverage for managers to encourage
more responsibility); id. at 1138 (agreeing that internal affairs doctrine is problematic and has
not led to a "race to the top").
3 See Dent, supra note 1, at 1120-21, 1128-29, 1133, 1142. See also infra note 69 for a
more detailed analysis and critique of Dent's argument in this regard.
4 In a comparison, using 2002 data, of major corporations (listed by sales) and countries
(listed by gross domestic product), fifty-two of the largest one-hundred entities were
corporations and forty-eight were countries. By this measure, Wal-Mart is larger than Sweden or
Norway; General Motors was slightly larger than Saudi Arabia; Exxon Mobil was the size of
Turkey; Home Depot was larger than New Zealand. See SARAH ANDERSON ET AL., FIELD
GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 69 (2d ed. 2005).
5 But corporate law has not always ignored the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders.
See ROBERT KUTTNER, THE SQUANDERING OF AMERICA: HOW THE FAILURE OF OUR POLITICS
UNDERMINES OUR PROSPERITY 145 (2008) ("As late as the 1890s, many states demanded that
corporations serve public purposes and strictly regulated their internal governance in exchange
for the limited liability granted to general corporations in their charters."); see also MORTON J.
HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
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corporate law is itself a testament to the belief that law is essential for
the market to work. This simple, straightforward notion of corporate
law being law, constructed by judges, regulators, and legislators,
works a profound shift in the debate about how to protect
stakeholders. The debate changes from whether law or the market
best protects the interests of the various contributors to the
corporation to what kind of law is needed.
Despite our different perspectives, it seems we are both
pragmatists in the sense that we agree that "the proper question is
whether [shareholder control] works better than any other option." 6
He believes it does; I believe it does not. We also differ on what data
we use to answer that question-whether we look at the fortunes of
shareholders alone or to all the stakeholders. Reading between the
lines, it appears that Dent believes we can answer that question by
looking at whether shareholders are better off under shareholder
primacy than under other governance systems.7 If shareholder welfare
is the only criteria, then a corporate governance system aimed at
maximizing shareholder wealth is likely to be a good match. If,
however, social welfare is the goal, then the claim that stakeholder
governance is likely to be an efficacious regulatory tool in addressing
the needs of non-shareholder stakeholders is quite strong.
This Essay responds to Professor Dent's critiques, with a focus on
the need for greater protection for employees within corporate
governance. Dent rightly points out that stakeholder governance
theorists often do not carefully define who stakeholders are.8 Dent
also argues that the selection of stakeholder representatives would be
ORTHODOXY 75-78 (1992) (describing process in late nineteenth century of corporations being
increasingly considered private creations rather than creatures of the state).
6 Dent, supra note 1, at 1119; see also id. at 1120 (agreeing that corporations, and
corporate law, are created in the interests of society as whole and that the questions are "how
corporations can best serve society, and what corporate governance structure best enables
corporations to accomplish this goal").
7 Id. at 1125 ("[L]owering profits by reducing inefficiency helps no one. Altering
corporate governance to lower returns to shareholders is also dubious because capital is
international and can move abroad."); id. at 1120 (after agreeing that the question is how best to
serve society, saying that an attack on shareholder welfare is "an attack on capitalism").
8 Id. at 1107-08. But this definitional problem is not as difficult as Dent makes out. As I
have argued elsewhere, building on the work of other scholars, one definition of stakeholders
that is workable and makes economic sense is to define stakeholders as those who contribute
firm-specific assets and skills to the firm. See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE
LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS & PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 142-44 (2006) [hereinafter
GREENFIELD, FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW]. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (describing the
value of corporate governance in overcoming the reluctance of various stakeholders to make
firm-specific investments in the firm).
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so difficult so as to doom the idea from the start.9 But neither
the definitional nor the implementation issue presents particular
difficulties for the argument that the interests of employees should
and can be taken into account in corporate governance. Employees
are clearly stakeholders of the firm, and the selection of employee
representatives on the board would be straightforward and, compared
to selecting shareholder representatives, achievable at relatively low
cost. 10 Isolating the debate to employees allows the discussion to
focus on what the real disagreement is: whether corporate law should
focus only on shareholder gain or not. If stakeholder theorists are
persuasive as to employees, we can then discuss whether the
definitional and implementation problems with regard to other
stakeholders make it too difficult to go that far. If, however,
stakeholder theory is not convincing even with regard to employees,
the definitional and implementation problems are simply beside the
point.
I. THE NEED FOR EMPLOYEE PROTECTION
If the current mix of regulation and market were working to
everyone's benefit and satisfaction, any argument in favor of
additional protection for corporate stakeholders would be a
non-starter. But that is not the situation in which we find ourselves, as
Professor Dent largely concedes." At the time of this writing, our
economy is in crisis, and we find ourselves in a full-blown
recession. 12 Sadly, this is the first time in recent history that we find
9 See Dent, supra note 1, at 1118 ("[T]he problem of implementation is inherent in
stakeholder theory.").
10 Election of employee representatives could be achieved with the creation of a separate
class of stock, which would be distributed to employees that met the agreed conditions, one
share per employee. The articles of incorporation would state the number of directors elected by
that class. Elections could be held annually, as with shareholder votes. For a description of the
various methods used in Europe to elect employee representatives to company boards, see
Norbert Kluge, Co-Determination in Europe, in REBECCA PAGE, CO-DETERMINATION IN
GERMANY - A BEGINNER'S GUIDE 31 (3d ed. 2006), available at http://www.boeckler.de/
pdf/parbp_033.pdf. For an excellent overview, see THE EUROPEAN COMPANY - PROSPECTS
FOR WORKER BOARD-LEVEL PARTICIPATION IN THE ENLARGED EU 64-65 (Norbert Kluge &
Michael Stollt eds., 2006), available at http://www.seeurope-network.org/homepages/
seeurope/file uploads/booklet2006.pdf [hereinafter THE EUROPEAN COMPANY] (chart of co-
determination forms around Europe).
I' See Dent, supra note 1, at 1108 ("In the last twenty-five years, too much of our
economic gains have gone to the wealthiest Americans; income for most Americans has
stagnated. The resultant deepening of economic inequality is disturbing."). Dent denies,
however, that these trends have anything to do with corporate governance. Id. That is the point
on which we disagree.
12 See Edmund L. Andrews, Sharp Drop in Jobs Adds to Grim Economic Picture, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2008, at A1; Peter S. Goodman, Slump Moves from Wall St. to Main St., N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 21, 2008, at Al; Floyd Norris, More Evidence That the Recession Has Already
2008] 1047
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ourselves at the end of a period of growth for the economy when the
economic well-being of the typical American did not also improve.13
So as we dip into recession or worse, it is reasonable to fear that the
economic fortunes of most Americans will decline further.
Even before the beginning of this downturn, the economic
situation for most wage earners in the United States was, at best,
stagnant and, for many, dire. As I have recently set out in more detail
elsewhere, 14 recent economic data show that while the total reported
income in the United States has been growing at a healthy rate,
average income is falling for nine out of ten Americans.15
Unfortunately, this stagnation is not a new phenomenon. The income
for Americans at the bottom of the pay scale has stayed essentially
flat for thirty years, and "real household income for the typical
[American] family has declined over the last seven years.' 16 These
declines are especially troubling when compared to the growth in
labor productivity in the United States, which had increased almost
40% in the fifteen years prior to 2004.17 There is little doubt that these
data will worsen in the current economic climate.
Arrived, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2008, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/10/25/business/25charts.html.
13 See Cafferty File, Is the American Dream Dead or Just Wounded?,
http://caffertyfile.blogs.cnn.com/2008/06/10/is-the-american-dream-dead-or-just-wounded/
(June 10, 2008, 17:21 EST) ("From the end of the 2001 recession through [2007] ... [was] the
first time since World War II that the typical family was worse off at the end of an economic
expansion than at the beginning."); Paul Krugman, The Great Wealth Transfer,
ROLLINGSTONE.COM, Nov. 30, 2006, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/
12699486/paul krugman on thegreat wealth transfer ("For the first time in our history, so
much growth is being siphoned off to a small, wealthy minority that most Americans are failing
to gain ground even during a time of economic growth .... ); Jodie T. Allen and Andrew
Kohut, Pinched Pocketbooks: Do Average Americans Spot Something that Most Economists
Miss?, PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, Mar. 28, 2006,
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/13/pinched-pocketbooks ("' [n]ot only have the bottom 90 percent
of American workers failed to keep up with productivity growth [from 2001-2004], many have
been harmed by it."' (quoting Ian Dew-Becker and Robert J. Gordon, Where Did the
Productivity Growth Go? Inflation Dynamics and the Distribution of Income 77 (Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 2: 2005), available at http://www.brookings.edu/es/
commentary/joumals/bpea-macro/forum/200509bpeagordon.pdf) (alteration in original)).
14 See Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2 HARV. L. &
POL. REV. 1, 2-5, 10-16 (2008) [hereinafter Greenfield, Reclaiming].
15 See also David Cay Johnston, Income Gap is Widening, Data Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
29, 2007, at Cl.
16 John Irons, Snapshot for September 5, 2007. Typical Families See Income and
Earnings Decline, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, Sept. 5, 2007, http://www.epi.org/
content.cfm/webfeatures_snapshots 20070905.
17 See LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2006/2007 fig.3N
(2007), available at http://www.epi.org/datazone/06/prodycomp.pdf (chart showing
"Productivity and Median and Average Compensation, 1973-2004").
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Poverty data are also relevant. As of 2005, the wages for about one
out of four American workers are so low that they fall below the
poverty line, and this proportion has increased over the last few
years. 18 The data are worse for women and people of color-nearly
30% of working women earn poverty wages, as do a third of African
American workers and almost four in ten Hispanic workers. 19
The economic difficulties of most Americans become more stark
when compared to the drastic improvements in the economic
well-being of the richest Americans. Since 1979 the richest 20% of
Americans have seen their income grow by almost 50%;20 the richest
1% of Americans have had their household income more than double
in the same period.2' In fact, for the first time since just before the
stock market crash of 1929, "the richest of the rich"-the wealthiest
one one-hundredth of 1% of Americans-claim 5% of all reported
personal income.22 In fact, the richest 10% of Americans, those
Americans making roughly $100,000 or more per year, now claim
almost half of all reported personal income.23 The richest 300,000
Americans together "make almost as much income as the bottom 150
million Americans.,
24
The situation is even worse when one focuses on wealth, as
opposed to income. While the bottom 90% of Americans account for
57.5% of the nation's personal income, they control less than 30% of
the nation's personal net worth and less than 20% of net financial
assets owned by individuals.25 By comparison, the top 1% of income
earners bring in 17% of the nation's personal income but own over
40% of net individual financial assets.26
Of course, statistics vary over time, but the trends are sufficiently
clear that one can persuasively argue that "the early years of the 21 st
century [are] truly another Gilded Age. 27
18 See id. at tbls.3.8-3.10 (tables showing "Share of All Workers Earning Poverty-Level
Hourly Wages, 1973-2005" (available at http://www.epi.org/datazone/06/povertywages.pdf)).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 62, fig.10.
21 Id.
22 Louis Uchitelle, The Richest of the Rich, Proud of a New Gilded Age, N.Y. TIMES, July
15, 2007, at Al, chart. These data may in fact underreport the inequality, because a greater
percentage of income for the wealthiest individuals comes from investment income, which is
typically underreported in income tax returns. See also Johnston, supra note 15 (noting that the
IRS "captures only about 70 percent of business and investment income, most of which flows to
upper-income individuals, because not everybody accurately reports such figures").
23 Johnston, supra note 15.
24 Id.
25 MISHEL ET AL., supra note 17, at 249 tbl.5.1.
26 Id.
27 Uchitelle, supra note 22.
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It is reasonable to believe that the lack of economic stability and
wellbeing for a majority of Americans has something to do with
corporations, since corporations are the primary source of private
wealth creation in the U.S. economy. (Approximately 60% of the
nation's income comes from the corporate sector.28) If these trends
are related to corporations, then they must be related to how they are
regulated and governed. As I have said elsewhere, I believe that part
of the problem is the short-term focus of corporate management,
which is a function of market, norm, and law. Another part of the
problem is the profit maximization norm, which is taken to mean a
focus on shareholder returns, as opposed to other, broader definitions
of profit or wealth. This focus on wealth, narrowly construed and
temporally limited, tends to make corporations ignore social harms as
well as the potential of social benefits. It tends to incentivize the
transfer of as much wealth from labor to capital as possible. It tends
to lead corporations to act with disregard toward non-shareholder
stakeholders. It inures to the benefit of the most well-off Americans,
and hurts the rest. 29 1 believe we can do better, using corporate law as
a progressive regulatory tool to provide broader benefits to society,
without eroding the ability of corporations to build wealth.3°
The next two sections will address a pair of Professor Dent's
criticism of this thesis, namely that: (1) shareholders deserve primacy
because they own the firm; and (2) while shareholders deserve even
greater legal protection than they now receive, other stakeholders
should depend on their market power to redress any difficulties they
face. I will then turn to a final critique, that any attempt to help
employees and other stakeholders would be counterproductive.
II. THE MISTAKEN ANALOGY OF SHAREHOLDERS AS OWNERS
One of the time-honored, but mistaken, ways to argue for
shareholder primacy is to analogize shareholders to owners. If they
are owners of the firm, then it is a straightforward argument that
managers' fiduciary duties run to them and that they should exercise
control over the firm. The argument is circular: that because
shareholders are owners, they should be treated as such, and other
stakeholders, who are not owners, should not be treated as owners.
Professor Dent consistently makes this mistake. He assumes that
shareholders are best seen as owners of the corporation, and then uses
28 MISHEL ET AL., supra note 17, at 82.
29 For a more in-depth argument on this point, see Greenfield, Reclaiming, supra note 14,
at 10-16.
30 See generally GREENFIELD, FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 8.
[Vol. 58:41050
DEFENDING STAKEHOLDER GOVERNANCE
that analogy to explain why they should be treated as owners and why
other stakeholders should not. The analogy cannot be the basis for
shareholder primacy. The argument for shareholder supremacy, if it is
to succeed, needs to start somewhere other than with an assumption
that imbeds in it the notion of shareholder supremacy. As Joseph
Singer has written, "To assume that we can know who property
owners are, and to assume that once we have identified them their
rights follow as a matter of course, is to assume what needs to be
decided.
3 1
A. Ownership, Investment, and the Socialism Bugaboo
Professor Dent is bold in his assertion of the property analogy,
asserting that the "control rights of stockholders can be compared to
the property rights of a homeowner." 32 The rights of stakeholders are
akin to the rights of neighbors-people who are affected by the
condition of the property but who do not have any direct say in what
the owner does with her property. With some narrow exceptions, says
Dent, "the owner may do as she pleases with her property."33
Shareholders are the same: "[1]ikewise, shareholders are supposed to
control the firm." 3 4 He equates directors with trust fiduciaries, who
"control[] other people's money,, 35 saying explicitly that "corporate
directors are fiduciaries for the shareholders' money.,
36
I agree that this is a fairly accurate description of what current
doctrine sets out. But as Dent is sure to understand, one cannot defend
current doctrine by restating it as the conclusion. The very question
an honest discussion about corporate governance is trying to answer
is, in property terms, who "owns" the firm. Are shareholders the only
owners, or is the corporation best seen as having multiple "owners"?
That is, if the questions of whether management owes a duty to
employees and other stakeholders, and whether employees and other
stakeholders are to be represented on the board, turn on who owns the
firm, then to posit shareholders as owners is to answer both questions.
Elsewhere, Dent makes another common mistake, conflating the
term "investor" with shareholder, implicitly making the same limiting
31 Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 611, 637-
38 (1988).
32 Dent, supra note 1, at 1114.
33 Id.
34 Id.; see also id. at 1119 (equating shareholders with "firm owners").
35 Id. at 1126 (noting "stakeholders contract with the firm and can either contract for
limits on risk or demand compensation for the risk they assume"); id. at 1112 n.24 ("If there are
net social benefits to cushioning employees from such harm, the cost of such cushioning should
be borne socially-i.e., by the government-rather than by shareholders.").
36 Id. at 1122-23.
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point as the ownership point above.37 Shareholders invest, and
therefore should have their interests protected. Other stakeholders are
parties to contracts with the firm, or a firm "cost," 38 and should
protect their own interests through contract or by petitioning
government to help them.39
Of course, shareholders are not owners of the firm the same way
homeowners own their house. They do not have the right of entry or
the right of exclusion, and their right to control is severely limited.4°
Nor are shareholders the only investors in the firm. They contribute
capital, to be sure, and they ought to have legal protections for that
investment. But others invest as well, and so should they.
Dent so reifies the status of shareholders that he equates an
attack on shareholder prerogatives as an attack on capitalism itself.
After agreeing that corporate governance should be measured
according to how society's interests are served, he short-circuits any
real consideration of the point by saying that anyone who supports a
system of governance that does not "enhance shareholder welfare"
attacks capitalism "[i]n effect." 41
It is difficult to know what he means by this, since none of the
scholars who are thoughtfully and carefully presenting arguments in
favor of stakeholder governance attack capitalism at all. No one is
suggesting state ownership of the means of production, and Dent's
insinuation that stakeholder governance is part of a slide toward
37 See, e.g., id. at 1108 (Even if CEO pay "comes entirely from the hides of investors, it
breeds understandable resentment among employees.").
38 See id at 1120 ("To an enterprise an employee is a cost .....
39 Id.
40 Shareholders are allowed to inspect corporate records and in limited circumstances can
force a corporation to act through a derivative suit, but these remedies require demand to be
made upon the board and are difficult to win and often have limited effect. See DEL. CH. CT. R.
23.1 (explaining shareholders should petition the board of directors to act before a derivative
suit can be brought to compel the corporation to act on behalf of the shareholders in a particular
matter, or must explain why they failed to do so); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 220 (2008)
(stockholders upon written demand may inspect the corporation's stock ledger, a list of its
stockholders, and its other books and records; this inspection right is limited to usual hours for
business); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (holding that a special
litigation committee can allow board of directors to reassert its authority over a derivative
claim); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, The Dividend Puzzle: Are Shares Entitled to the Residual?, 32
J. CoP. L. 103, 145 (2006) ("Shareholders, unlike owners, have no legal right to control the
corporation and specifically no right to demand that the corporation turn over corporate
property-whether surplus or not-to them."); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Introduction to the
Metaphors of Corporate Law, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 273, 278-84 (2005) (outlining the many
ways in which shareholders do not have property rights in the corporation).
41 See Dent, supra note 1, at 1120; see also id. at 1112, n.24 ("If there are net social
benefits to cushioning employees from such harm, the cost of such cushioning should be bome
socially-i.e., by the government-rather than by shareholders."). This is another example of
how shareholder primacy is bound to work. Shareholders can manage the firm to spin off social
costs, which can be left to government to address.
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socialism ("why not have socialism?" he asks) 42 comes close to name
calling. He hastens to say that he does not accuse me or Professor
Glynn of "being un-American, 'A3 but that reads as damnation with
faint praise indeed. To have the ideas of stakeholder advocates
compared to Dracula, an ogre, fantasy, and utopia is one thing;44 to be
called a socialist, even implicitly, is a serious and unfair charge. I
would have hoped that the debate about stakeholder governance
would have moved beyond where we were a generation ago, when
Milton Friedman attempted to use the socialism bugaboo to criticize
the nascent corporate social responsibility movement.45 Friedman was
not successful then in stopping the trend toward holding corporations
more accountable; the comparison of stakeholder advocacy with
socialism is not any more persuasive now.
What stakeholder advocates call for is a greater democratization of
corporate governance-to import into the governance of the firm the
interests of stakeholders other than shareholders. How has
shareholder and managerial autocracy been reified as the very
embodiment of capitalism? Shareholder primacy equates with
capitalism only if shareholders are considered the owners of the firm
and its assets, and if their rights analogize with home owners and
other owners of physical property. But if the corporation is seen as a
cooperative entity, with all kinds of different investors, then the
corporation itself can be seen as the owner of its assets, with the
obligation to manage them for the benefit of the entity itself (and all
its investors). The market is still private; the corporation is still
private; the market still works to reward those who produce goods
and services that can be sold for a profit; the market still brings about
the "creative destruction" of those businesses who cannot so
produce.46 Readers of Dent's critique can sleep soundly without fear
of the socialist menace.
Once we clear the smoke of the argument that shareholder rights
are the core of capitalism, what is the substantive basis for the claim
for shareholder ownership in particular, and shareholder primacy in
general? There are a number of different claims that shareholder
advocates make, many of which I have answered elsewhere.47 Dent
42 Id. at 1119.
43 Id. at 1141.
ld. at 1107.
11 See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine), at SM17 (equating loosening the corporation's duty to
shareholders with "pure and unadulterated socialism").
46 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81-86 (1942)
(Chapter VII, entitled "The Process of Creative Destruction").
47 See GREENFIELD, FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 8, at 41-71; Kent
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focuses on the argument that shareholders are "the primary residual
claimants" of the finn.48 This merits response.
B. Shareholders as Residual Claimants
Professor Dent presents the proposition that, as residual claimants,
shareholders "'have the greatest incentive to maximize the value of
the firm. ' 49 He argues that the financial interests of other
stakeholders are "largely fixed and senior to those of the
shareholders., 50 While other stakeholders can be satisfied without
making a profit, shareholders benefit only when the firm prospers.
They enjoy "'the perspective of the aggregate"' because if the firm is
managed in such a way as to benefit shareholders then the whole firm,
and everyone associated with it, benefits.5
There are a number of ways to answer the residual claimant
argument, but perhaps the most important is to point out that the rules
of liquidation do not require a particular governance structure for a
company as a going concern. There is nothing inherent in the right of
equity investors to receive the financial residual of the company in the
event of liquidation that automatically gives them the sole power to
control the firm. Companies sometimes place creditor representatives
on governing boards as a result of bond negotiations and the like,52
and the inclusion of employee representatives on company boards is
routine in Europe.53 The recognition that shareholders own the
residual as a financial matter does not necessarily mean they should
control the decisions of the firm. Dent cites Jonathan R. Macey, but
Macey recognizes that residual claims do not necessarily lead to
control: "'[o]nce we view the shareholders as simply the residual
claimants . . . it is far from self-evident that shareholders are
necessarily entitled to control the firm,' i.e., to have managers' and
directors' fiduciary duties flow exclusively to them., 54 One can
Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283 (1998).
48 Dent, supra note 1, at 1113.
49 Id. (quoting Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to
Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
1266, 1267-68 (1999)).
50 Id.
5' Id. (quoting Bayless Manning, Thinking Straight About Corporate Law Reform, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1977, at 3, 20-23); see also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE,
CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 469-70 (2002).
52 See Janus Hotels & Resorts Inc. 10KSB/A SEC Filing (April 28, 2000), excerpt
available at http://sec.edgar-online.com/2000/04/28/l1/0001046386-00-000059/Section2.asp
(Arthur Lubell was a "creditor representative member of the Board of Directors").
53 See Kluge, supra note 10, at 31; THE EUROPEAN COMPANY, supra note 10, at 64-65.
54 See Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationale for Making
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certainly imagine, for example, a company that acknowledges
responsibilities to a number of stakeholders but still issues common
stock that constitutes residual claims on the financial surplus of the
company. Framed in contractual terms, one could easily write a
corporate "contract" that does not link the residual claim on financial
assets to be distributed in case of liquidation with a sole claim on the
attentions of the directors.
The stronger argument for shareholder primacy asserts that
because shareholders own the residual, their financial interests best
track the interests of the firm as a whole. The best proxy for firm
value is the size of the residual, the argument goes, so looking after
the interests of shareholders is the best proxy for looking after the
interest of the firm as whole.
At first glance, this argument is persuasive. But notice the implicit
jumps in logic buried in the claim: The purpose of corporations, and
corporate law, is to benefit society (as Dent agrees); 55 the best way to
benefit society is to maximize the value of the firm; the best way to
maximize value to the firm is for management to act as if only
shareholders matter.
The last two jumps are contestable, and depend on political as well
as financial judgments. First, it may not be that the best way to benefit
society is to maximize the value of corporations. The building of
wealth is a crucial goal of society, and corporations are a
fundamental, indeed central, part of that effort. But other values
matter as well, such as stability and fairness and sustainability.
Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere,56 left to their own devices
corporations are indifferent between making profit by building wealth
and making profit by extracting economic rents from society by
externalizing social costs or merely shifting financial surplus from
others to themselves. Also, even if firm value is maximized by
creating wealth rather than shifting it around, social welfare is not
maximized in my view (and apparently in Dent's) 57 unless that wealth
is widely distributed. The reasons for my belief in the importance of
distribution are partly economic (because of the diminishing utility of
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV.
23, 27 (1991) (citation omitted).
55 Dent, supra note 1, at 1120 n.61.
56 See GREENFIELD, FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 8, at 137.
57 See Dent, supra note 1, at 1125 (saying it is "regrettable" that wealth is so concentrated,
and suggesting that encouraging efficiency in corporations and redistributing wealth through
taxes is the better public policy choice to reduce economic inequality); see also id. at 1142-43
(suggesting that maximizing share price should be the goal of progressives because employees
will benefit).
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money, widely shared wealth raises social welfare more than
concentrated wealth), partly political (democracy thrives better in a
society without huge economic disparities), and partly social
(inequality creates the context for crime, social unrest, and other ills).
If I am right about this, then for social welfare to be maximized we
need to care not only about the creation of firm value but its
allocation as well. And if allocation matters, then it is not clear at all
that shareholder primacy leads to the correct regulatory mechanisms
to achieve the balance of wealth creation and wealth distribution.58
That brings us to the second of the two problematic assumptions
above, i.e., that the best way to maximize firm value is for
management to act as if only shareholder interests matter. This, too, is
contestable, and for a very straightforward reason: the interests of
shareholders and the firm do not in fact coalesce in all circumstances.
(And more obviously, the interests of shareholders do not coalesce
with the interests of other stakeholders.) Dent recognizes this,59 but
holds that it does not matter. Shareholders, because they hold the
financial residual, benefit disproportionately when the firm does well.
Because of limited liability, shareholders are disproportionately
protected when the firm does poorly. That means that, if the firm is
managed as if shareholder interests are all that matter, the firm will be
managed to prefer risky endeavors that have high potential payoffs
but are also high risk and have high variability. The more leveraged a
firm is, the more shareholders will stand to benefit from such risky
strategies and the less likely such strategies will actually maximize
firm value.6 ° (The financial crisis we are now experiencing is a
wonderful example of this very thing.)
58 The ownership of stock in the United States is very concentrated: the richest one-tenth
of I% of Americans receive over a third of the nation's total capital income, while the bottom
80% of Americans control less than 13%. See MISHEL ET AL., supra note 17, at 78-79, 80
fig. IS. For a more detailed treatment of this point, see Greenfield, Reclaiming, supra note 14, at
10-16.
59 Dent, supra note 1, at 1111-12 (neither stakeholders nor shareholders have reason to
heed interests other than their own); id. at 1117-18 (stakeholders present conflicts that are
"glaring and overwhelming," making "irreconcilable demands on corporate resources"); id. at
1121 (noting that employees are costs "to be reduced or eliminated whenever possible"); id. at
1125 (noting that beyond the short term, the interests of shareholders and stakeholders
"diverge.").
60 Dent appears to concede this point. See Dent, supra note 1, at 1126 ("Because of
limited liability and investment diversification, rational shareholders of a firm with substantial
debt might prefer risky projects with negative net present value to safe projects with positive
value."); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REv. 833, 905 (2005) ("To begin with, high leverage produces its own inefficiency
distortions. For example, high leverage induces management whose wealth is tied to equity
value to take excessive risks. The greater the leverage, the larger the costs of distortions arising
from it." (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 333-37 (1976))); Mark
1056 [Vol. 58:4
DEFENDING STAKEHOLDER GOVERNANCE
The description so far is simply a restatement of a financial truism.
But from a broader perspective, the distinction grows. Shareholders
typically invest in a number of different companies and thus have
diversified portfolios. As a result, they do not care a great deal about
the risks that any one particular firm is taking. Shareholders will
prefer that the management of any particular company they invest in
makes decisions that may provide high payoffs but risk bankruptcy
over decisions that provide lower returns but have less risk of pushing
the firm into liquidation. Indeed, shareholders are indifferent toward
the liquidation risk of any particular company in which they invest as
long as their portfolio as a whole maximizes their expected returns.
6 1
By way of comparison, now consider a corporation whose
management considers not only the interests of shareholders but
of employees as well. Both shareholders and employees have residual
interests in the firm, in that the investments of both will tend to be
positively correlated with firm value.62 I have written about this
extensively, but suffice to say here that employees have financial
interests that rise and fall with the fortunes of the firm. Some
employees' wage and salary claims (though not all) may be fixed in
the short term, but employees also have both implicit and explicit
claims against the enterprise that are more valuable when the
company does well and are worth less (or nothing) when the company
does poorly. Unfixed, explicit claims against the company might
include pension plans, 401(k) accounts, or other retirement benefits.
These can constitute a significant percentage of a worker's net worth
and, as the collapse of Enron exemplified, can lose much or all of
their value if the company fails. Unfixed, implicit claims might
include understandings about job security or promotion
policies, the development of firm-specific human capital, and the
safety of working conditions. When a company's management makes
good decisions for the enterprise as a whole, workers' fortunes
improve even if their wages or salaries remain the same. When a
company's management makes poor decisions for the enterprise,
workers' fortunes decline even if their wages or salaries are
S. Beasley, Donald P. Pagach, & Richard S. Warr, Information Conveyed in Hiring
Announcements of Senior Executives Overseeing Enterprise- Wide Risk Management Processes,
23 J. OF ACcT. AUDITING & FIN. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 21, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1010203) ("[Sihareholders of highly leveraged firms may not want risk
reduction as it reduces the value of the option .... ).
61 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 28 (1991) ("[T]he investor wants to maximize the value of his holdings, not
the value of a given stock.").
62 GREENFIELD, FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 8, at 54-59.
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unchanged in the narrow sense. While shareholders are largely
indifferent as to whether any particular firm fails, employees are
vitally interested in the success of their employers.
Instead of being indifferent toward the liquidation risk of the
company they work for, employees care deeply about the financial
health of their firm because they face harsh consequences from
unemployment if their firm suffers. If their company goes bankrupt,
employees will typically lose their jobs, the value of any firm-specific
skills, and sometimes retirement or pension benefits. Therefore,
employees prefer that the management of a company they work for
not make decisions with a high variance, even when such decisions
have a high expected return. Employees instead prefer decisions that
value stability and long-term growth.
So will the inclusion of employee interests into firm governance
mean that firms will fail more often? Just the opposite. The inclusion
of employees' interests into the fabric of corporate governance will
encourage firms to be more dedicated to their own success. Because
shareholders want companies to take risks that other stakeholders do
not, there is little doubt that shareholder primacy results in more
companies going under than if companies were required to take into
account the interests of other stakeholders.
So the decision as to whether to include the interests of employees
into the management calculus may depend on whether we want an
economy that is fast growing and fast falling, high growth and high
failure (which is pretty clearly the one we have), or an economy that
grows more slowly and values stability over time. Once that is the
question, there is little reason to believe that society as a whole is risk
neutral with regard to corporate decisions. Of course society benefits
from corporate growth, but it is also concerned with stability, and the
avoidance of harm. It would be eminently reasonable for a society
(especially those with mature economies such as those of the United
States or Europe) to decide to forgo the possibility of very high
corporate profits in order to avoid the disproportionate harm
employees (or communities, or creditors) would suffer if risky
business decisions do not pay off. This is especially true if only a
subset of society-the affluent who still own the vast majority of
shares-reap a disproportionate share of the gains if the risky
decision does pay off. In other words, society as a whole (or, for that
matter, any of us as individuals, in our daily lives) is not an absolute
profit maximizer. There are other economic and non-economic
"goods" we value. It would be odd, then, to assume without question
that a major subset of our law-the area that regulates the internal
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workings of some of the most powerful institutions in our
culture-should be constructed to maximize only financial profit at
all costs.
6 3
In any event, note that once the difference in risk aversion is
considered, the argument for shareholder dominance depends on the
claim that employees care too much about the fortunes of their firm.
A proponent of the shareholder-centered view of corporate law would
have to make the ironic argument that it is better for society as a
whole for the decision making of each individual firm to be
dominated by shareholders, who care little about the fortunes of each
firm. On its own terms, this is hardly self-evident, and it is not what
shareholder proponents typically say. As described above, the
argument is usually that shareholders are the only ones that have the
incentives to care about the success of the firm. That is certainly not
the case. Employees, too, have incentives to care, and employees who
depend on their company for their livelihood are bound to care more
about the success and survival of their individual firm than do
shareholders who own hundreds of stocks in diversified portfolios.
III. WHY THE MARKET IS NOT ENOUGH
Throughout Dent's critique, he repeatedly argues that corporate
law should not be adjusted to take into account the interests of
stakeholders because they should either protect themselves through
contract or should be protected through other kinds of regulation.
Meanwhile, Dent makes clear that he believes shareholders should
receive increased protection from corporate governance law. I might
be convinced by Professor Dent that shareholders merit increased
protection, especially from executive managers' self-dealing and
excessive compensation schemes. But it will not surprise the careful
reader to learn that I believe stakeholders, particularly employees,
deserve additional protection as well from corporate governance law.
Once stakeholders are seen as investors, there is no reason to deny
them the same access to corporate governance that shareholders
receive. If shareholders need additional protection, the need for
protection of other stakeholders is bound to be at least as great, given
their marginalized status at present.
One of the notes Dent consistently plays is the "If stakeholders
really wanted more protection they would contract for it" argument.
63 Again, the current financial crisis would be a great case study to bolster the point made
in the text, written before the crisis reached full steam. If companies had valued stability a bit
more and been a bit more fearful of financial risk, it is unlikely that our economy would be in its
present state.
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Employee representation is not efficient, he says, because we do not
observe employees negotiating for it as a part of their collective
bargaining. 64 If employee representation were efficient, he asks, "why
hasn't it happened through private arrangements? '65 Stakeholders do
not need additional protection because they "contract with the firm
and can either contract for limits on risk or demand compensation for
the risk they assume." 66 If stakeholders are not successful in reaching
the bargain they want, they can withdraw their investment.
"Employees can quit their jobs and customers can take their business
to other suppliers if they are dissatisfied. 67 Dent admits that
employees in particular feel that the right to exit may be inadequate,
but asserts that corporations do not "enjoy a bargaining advantage
over employees."
Dent asserts that the market adequately protects employees in part
because "stockholders striving to maximize share value have
significant incentives to treat employees decently., 68 He is so sure of
this coalescence of interests that he argues "it is doubtful that there is
any systemic problem of mistreatment of workers to begin with., 69 It
is not an unfair paraphrase of Dent's argument, then, to say that the
market (that is, the right to contract) should be trusted as the primary
mechanism to protect stakeholders. If stakeholders want protection,
they should bargain for it. If they cannot win that right, they should
go elsewhere.
Dent's arguments about the market power of stakeholders in
general and employees in particular seem fanciful to anyone keeping
up with the state of working America in the early twenty-first
century. 70 To argue, for example, that American workers should
depend on collective bargaining to protect themselves, in an era in
which unions represent less than 10% of the private work force, is to
whistle past the graveyard. To suggest that the right to quit one's job
and seek out a different one provides anything close to the power of
capital to move fluidly from market to market, country to country, is
laughable. To suggest that employees need not worry because
4 Dent, supra note 1, at 1126. Note that Dent wrote these arguments before the current
crisis in the equity and credit markets. If the argument that players in the market can protect
themselves was persuasive at all before the crisis, it certainly cannot be now.
65 Id. at 1115.
66 Id at 1126.
67 Id. at 1135.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1128.
70 An excellent resource is MISHEL ET AL., supra note 17 (cataloging socio-economic data
from the standpoint of working America).
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shareholders have their back is contradicted by Dent's own
admissions elsewhere in his piece."
Dent's advocacy of the market as the mechanism for self-help ends
when he turns to shareholders, however. Dent believes shareholders
should be protected by law because "[m]arkets operate within the
law; misguided laws impair market efficiency," "markets are not
frictionless," and "[m]arkets . . . take time. 72 Thus, shareholders
should receive additional protection through law,73 including an
expanded duty of care of corporate officers 74 and a right to nominate
board members.75
So Professor Dent and I do not differ in our belief that markets are
a product of law and that regulation is often necessary to overcome
market defects and, in his words, "to give effect to the public
interest.',76 We simply differ in that he believes legal protections
should be focused on shareholders, and I believe we should extend
those protections to stakeholders, particularly employees.
To be fair, our disagreement is even less than that. At points in his
critique, Dent concedes that employees and other stakeholders should
be protected in various ways by regulation and law, just not by
corporate governance law. He says that "[t]he market alone does not
entirely solve the problem[s]" stakeholders face, and he proposes a
few concrete, if mild, suggestions to assist them: better information
about physical hazards,77 "direct regulation of hazardous activities,
' 78
and a more progressive tax policy 79 (so that, I presume, the wealth
earned by shareholders can be redistributed to lower-income
Americans).
These regulatory protections would be welcome, but Dent's
proposal of them makes stark the question of why adjustments to
corporate governance law are not on the table. Corporate law is law,
too, and it may even be better suited than other regulatory initiatives
to the end goal of protecting all the stakeholders of the firm, while
maintaining the wealth-producing nature of corporations.
80
71 Dent, supra note 1, at 1111-12, 1117, 1120, 1125; see also supra note 59 and
accompanying text.
72 George W. Dent, Jr., Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and Director
Primacy Models of Corporate Governance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1213, 1249-50 (2008)
[hereinafter Dent, Academics in Wonderland].
73 Dent, supra note 1, at 1120-21 (favoring the "strongest possible shareholder rights").
74 ld. at 1128-29, 1133.
75 Id. at 1142.
76 Id. at 1124.
77 Id. at 1126.
78 Id. at 1127.
79 Id. at 1125.
80 See GREENFIELD, FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 8, at 141-42; Greenfield,
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IV. IS STAKEHOLDER GOVERNANCE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE?
A number of stakeholder theorists have argued for some time
about the benefits, both realized and potential, of stakeholder
governance. 81 My own work has set out my arguments why
stakeholder governance would both mitigate some of the pathologies
of the corporate form82 and empower corporations to be an even
greater progressive force in society by building wealth and broadly
distributing it.83 I have argued at some length how changes in
corporate governance can be more efficient, as regulatory tools and in
comparison with other public policy options available, in
addressing certain difficult socio-economic issues such as stagnant
wages and economic inequality.84 I have also suggested ways in
which stakeholder governance would improve the management of
companies.85 In addition, I have answered critiques of stakeholder
governance based on the fear of globalization and on the worry that
imposing greater responsibility on managers actually releases them
Reclaiming, supra note 14, at 22-28.
8I See Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation:
Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, ACAD. MGMT. REV., Jan. 1995, at 65, 65-91 (quoting
then-CEO of Sears, General Robert E. Wood, in 1950 saying, "All I can say is that if the other
three parties named above [customers, employees, community] are properly taken care of, the
stockholder will benefit in the long pull" (citation omitted)); see also John Nirenberg, Profit by
Doing the Right Thing, THE NATION (Thailand), Dec. 9, 2002, available at 2002 WLNR
7731977 ("The big message of the [Business for Social Responsibility in the US] conference
was that being responsive to stakeholders-not just stockholders-actually results in higher
profits when it is part of an overall CSR strategy."). For a current review of the state of the
corporate social responsibility movement, see John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, The
Corporate Social Responsibility Movement as an Ethnographic Problem (UNC Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 1285631, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1285631. See also
Blair & Stout, supra note 8; David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223
(1991); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579 (1992); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital
Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993); Silvia Ayuso, Miguel Angel Arifio, Roberto Garcia Castro &
Miguel A. Rodriguez, Maximizing Stakeholders' Interests: An Empirical Analysis of the
Stakeholder Approach to Corporate Governance (IESE Business School, Working Paper No.
670, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=982325.
82 See Greenfield, Reclaiming, supra note 14, at 7-10, 21-28; Kent Greenfield,
Proposition: Saving the World with Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 947, 964-74 (2008)
[hereinafter Greenfield, Proposition].
83 See Greenfield, Reclaiming, supra note 14, at 21-28; Greenfield, Proposition, supra
note 82, at 978-81; see also GREENFIELD, FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 8, at 153-
85.
84 Greenfield, Reclaiming, supra note 14, at 21-23; Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral
Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 581, 640-44 (2002)
85 Greenfield, Proposition, supra note 82.
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from any responsibility. 86 There is little reason to rehash those
arguments here.
I want to dedicate this last section to answering one point that
Professor Dent emphasizes that I have not addressed in depth before,
namely that greater protections for employees would be
"counterproductive. 87 If he is right, the arguments for stakeholder
governance would of course be weakened. But I believe he is wrong
on this point.
I take Professor Dent's argument to follow this syllogism:
employees benefit from a vibrant economy; employee protections
make the economy less vibrant; therefore employees are hurt by
employee protections. "[J]ob creation has been much better in
economies that make it easier for employers to dismiss employees,"
he says. 88 "Thus shareholder control is probably the best arrangement
for each firm's employees., 89 By this logic, to seek to help employees
is to hurt them.
There is some truth in what Dent says, to the extent that the
protection of any investor can go so far as to retard economic
vibrancy. If employees are protected from termination even when
they perform poorly, the economy suffers. The economy also suffers
when community protections are set so high that companies cannot
build new factories or risk the sale of new products, or when
protections for creditors are set so high that businesses cannot
borrow money. But the economy also suffers when protections
for shareholders are set too high, whether by having standards
of disclosure too stringent, setting the fiduciary obligations of
management too high, or-for what it's worth-providing a
guarantee for shareholder investment.90
But sometimes protection for investors (of all kinds) can facilitate
investment and thereby make the economy more vibrant. Dent
recognizes this truth when it comes to shareholders, but he is blind to
it with regard to the others who invest in the firm. That may be
because of the distinction he makes between shareholders-who he
sees as the sole investors-and the other stakeholders-who he sees
as costs. 91 But once we recognize the collective nature of the firm, it
is much more difficult to make the distinctions he makes, and in fact
86 Greenfield, Reclaiming, supra note 14, at 28-32.
87 Dent, supra note 1, at 1121.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 See id. at 1136-38 (proposing, as a thought experiment, a regime wherein each
shareholder would be allowed "to recover the capital she invested in the corporation" at any
time).
91 Id. at 1120-21.
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his arguments about shareholders can be applied to employees as
well.
Consider his point that legal protections for shareholders lower the
cost of capital. Shareholder rights, he says, "will reassure investors
that America is the safest place to put their money," 92 which will
mean that more institutions and individuals will want to buy stock in
U.S. companies, lowering the cost of capital for those companies. In
other words, the protections for capital will make holders of capital
more likely to invest.
The same argument would apply to others who invest in the firm.
If legal protections lower the cost of capital, then legal protections
should lower the cost of other investments as well. Take employees,
for example. In a legal regime in which their investment gives them
no say in corporate governance and no redress other than exit, and
leaves them vulnerable to having their firm-specific skills exploited or
expropriated, they will be less likely to invest their labor. A legal
regime that disregards their interests will not-to borrow Dent's
phraseology--"reassure [workers] that America is the safest place" 93
to work, and they will seek to protect themselves, to the extent they
can, in other ways. They may demand a higher wage; they may
demand more explicit job security protections; they may moderate
their effort; they may solicit their legislators to protect them in other
ways.
My point is simply that whatever argument about the
counterproductivity of legal protections for employees is available
can be made vis-a-vis shareholders. And any argument about the
benefit of legal protections toward shareholders can be made vis-a-vis
employees.
The reason why this notion is so often missed is the lack of parallel
structure in how the "counterproductivity argument" is typically
made. Consider Dent's passage where he discusses the benefits of
shareholder protections and the cost of employee protections.94 In the
former, the benefits of the legal protections are the focus: legal
protections lower the cost of capital, making the economy more
vibrant. Ignored are the costs of the legal protection (SEC regulations,
the fiduciary obligations of managers, the framework of shareholder
voting, the structure of securities markets). When the frame shifts to
employee protection, it is the cost of the protections that are
mentioned. The benefits of that protection are left out of the equation.
92 Id. at 1121.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 1120-22, 1141-43.
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As I said earlier, Dent might persuade me that greater shareholder
protection is necessary, especially if the interests of long-term holders
are prioritized over day traders and the like. But I would like to
persuade him that he and other shareholder primacy theorists have
undervalued the potential benefits of increased employee protection
within the corporate form. He recognizes that employees deserve
more protection than they now receive (though outside of corporate
law), so he must also believe that such protections can be on balance
beneficial, even if the protections themselves do cost something. He
is a good enough economic thinker to recognize that, from the
perspective of the firm as a whole, costs are costs. This is true
whether they come in the form of "external" regulations of the
corporation (mandating a minimum wage, for example, or protection
from hazardous chemicals), or in the form of a mandate that the
"internal" processes of the firm take into account the interests of
employees by way of adjusting fiduciary duties or the structure of the
board. My argument is simply that employees may be made better off,
at a lower cost, through the use of corporate governance reforms than
through other regulatory mechanisms.
CONCLUSION
Professor Dent and I agree that "[m]arkets operate within the law"
and that we have not reached the best possible mix of corporate
governance rules.95 We disagree about which way to turn from here. I
believe that adjustments in corporate law could be a powerful
regulatory tool; he wants corporate law to focus even more on the
rights and interests of shareholders. To do so would certainly
represent a missed opportunity; it also might make matters worse. All
of the investors in the corporation-not just shareholders--deserve
better.
95 Dent, Academics in Wonderland, supra note 72, at 1249.
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